Learnability and the Statistical Structure of Language: Poverty of Stimulus Arguments Revisited by John D. Lewis & Jeffrey L. Elman
Learnability and the Statistical Structure of Language: Poverty
of Stimulus Arguments Revisited
John D. Lewis and Jeffrey L. Elman
UC San Diego & McGill University, and UC San Diego
1. Introduction
Statistical learning, and “any account which assigns a fundamental role to
segmentation, categorization, analogy, and generalization” is rejected in Chom-
skyan linguistics as “mistaken in principle” (Chomsky, 1975). Acquisition is
viewed, rather, as a search through the set of possible grammars for natural lan-
guage,guidedbysuccessive inputs; or alternatively,as a parametersetting process
in which the inputs serve as triggers. The stochastic nature of the input is thus ig-
nored supposedly the learner is oblivious to the distributional frequencies of
lexical items, grammatical constructions, and utterance types.
Recent acquisition research, however, has shown that children, and even in-
fants, are sensitivetothe statistical structureoftheirlinguisticinput(Saffranet al.,
1996; Aslin et al., 1998; Gomez and Gerken, 1999; Newport and Aslin, 2000).
The situation with respect to learnability is thus signiﬁcantly different from
that which has been assumed. Stochastic languages may be learnable from pos-
itive examples alone, while their non-stochastic analogues require negative evi-
dence (Gold, 1967; Horning, 1969; Angluin, 1988). Indeed, as Chomsky (1981)
observed, distributional information can provide “a kind of ‘negative evidence’”
in that expectations can be formed which may then be violated. And so, in at
least some cases, the so-called ‘logical problems’ associated with the no negative
evidence hypothesis may be solved by admitting the stochastic information.
Thus, if UG is to account for all and only those properties of language “that
can reasonably be supposed not to have been learned” (Chomsky, 1975) we must
adopt a learning theory which is sensitive to the statistical properties of the input,
and reassess poverty of stimulus arguments under those theoretical assumptions.
This paper illustrates this by showing that the “parade case of an innate con-
straint” (Crain, 1991) i.e., Chomsky’s (1975) poverty of stimulus argument
that structure dependencemust be a principle of UG fails to hold once stochas-
tic information is admitted; the property of language in question is shown to be
learnable with a statistical learning algorithm.
Chomsky (1975) suggests that it is reasonable to suppose that aux-questions
are derived from declaratives, and so children, presumably exposed to only
simple forms of either type, should be free to generate either of two sorts of
rules: a structure-independent rule i.e. move the ﬁrst ‘is’ or the correct
structure-dependent rule. Chomsky argues that since “cases that distinguish the
hypotheses rarely arise,” (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980) at least some children can be
assumed not to encounter the relevant evidence for a considerable portion of their
lives. Thus, since the structure-independent hypothesis generates ungrammatical
forms like (2) in place of the correct (1), children should be expected to makesuch mistakes. Since they do not (Crain and Nakayama, 1987; Crain, 1991),
despite that the correct rule is supposedly more complex, Chomsky suggests
1) Is the man who is smoking crazy?
2) *Is the man who smoking is crazy?
that “the only reasonable conclusion is that UG contains the principle that all
such rules must be structure-dependent” (Chomsky, 1975) i.e. that during the
course of language acquisition, children must entertain only hypotheses which
respect the abstract structural organization of language, though the data may also
be consistent with structure-independenthypotheses.
This conclusion depends, of course, on more assumptions than just that the
input available to children does not reliably contain questions like “Is the jug of
milk that’s in the fridge empty?” an assumptionthat has beennotedto be some-
what questionable (Cowie, 1998). It is apparently also assumed that the learner
makes use of no form of generalization whatsoever; for as Sampson (1989) has
pointed out, evidence to distinguish the two hypotheses is provided by any utter-
ance in which any auxiliary precedes the main clause auxiliary. And so evidence
is also provided by questions like “Is the ball you were speaking of in the box
with the bowling pin?”, and “Where’s this little boy who’s full of smiles?”, and
even“While you’resleeping, shall I make the breakfast?” all of whichare from
CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000)1, and presumably instances of structures which
are not overly rare in child-directed speech. Indeed, Pullum and Scholz (2001)
estimate that such examples make up about one percent of a typical corpus. Thus,
since learners receive approximatelythree years of languageexposurebefore they
exhibitthe knowledgein question, it is perhapsunrealistic to assume that they will
not encounter evidence of this sort.
Here we show, however, that even in the total absence of the above sort of
evidence,thestochastic informationin datauncontroversiallyavailabletochildren
is sufﬁcient to allow for learning. Building on recent work with simple recurrent
networks (SRNs; Elman 1990), we show that the correct generalization emerges
from the statistical structure of the data.
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Figure 1: An SRN. Solid lines rep-
resent full connectivity; the dashed
line indicates a copy connection.
Figure 1 shows the general struc-
ture of an SRN. The network com-
prises a three-layer feed-forward net-
work made up of the input, hid-
den, and output layers augmented
by a context layer, identical in size to
the hidden layer, and connected to it
bi-directionally. Each layer consists of
a number of simple processing units
which are connected to the units in
other layers as indicated in the ﬁgure;
i.e., each of the units in the input and
context layers connects to every unit in
1These examples are from Brown’s Adam, Korman’s St, and Manchester’s
Anne, respectively.the hidden layer, and each unit in the hidden layer connects to its corresponding
unit in the context layer, as well as to every unit in the output layer.
An input to the network is a set of activation values on the input units, and
the corresponding network output is the set of activation values that result on the
output units. These values are computed in the same manner as with all units
in the network: the activation value of a unit is the sum of the activation values
of every unit that connects to it i.e., its net input squashed by the logistic
function to fall between 0 and 1.
The recurrent connections between the hidden and context layers provide a
one-stepstatememory. Ateachtimesteptheactivationvalueofeachofthehidden
units is copied to the corresponding unit in the context layer, and the connections
from the context layer back to the hidden layer make these values available as
additional inputs at the next time step.
The network receives its input sequentially, and learns through prediction: it
attempts to predict the next input at each step, and utilizes its prediction errors to
correct its connection weights. At the outset of training, the connection weights
and activation values are random,but to the extent that there are sequential depen-
denciesinthedata,thenetworkwillreduceitspredictionerrorbybuildingabstract
representations that capture these dependencies. Structured representations thus
emerge over time as a means of minimizing error; and such representations, to the
extent that they provide for accurate predictions, can be thought of as a grammar.
Networks of this sort have been shown capable of learning solutions to two
problems that we suggest are relevant to Chomsky’s structure-dependence argu-
ment.
Elman (1991, 1993) provided such a network2 with a corpus of language-
like sentences which could be either simple (transitive or intransitive), or con-
tain multiply embedded relative clauses (in which the head noun could be ei-
ther the subject or object of the subordinate clause). The input was presented
as word sequences, where words were represented as orthogonal vectors a
localist representation so that no information about either the words or the
grammatical structure was supplied; thus the network had to extract all infor-
mation (e.g., the grammatical categories, number agreement, subcategorization
frames, and selectional restrictions) from regularities in the input. The network
learned the structure of such sentences so as to predict the correct agreement
patterns between subject nouns and their corresponding verbs, even when the
two were separated by a relative clause with multiple levels of embedding, e.g.
boys who like the girl who Mary hates hate Mary.3,4
2The network used differed only in that reduction layers were added between
the input and hidden layers, and the hidden and output layers. This addition al-
lowed the localist representations — strings of 0s with a single bit set to 1 —
used for the inputs and outputs, to be re-represented in distributed form for the
mappings to and from the hidden layer, and also reduced the overall number of
connections in the network.
3The network succeeded only if either the input was structured, or the net-
work’s memory was initially limited, and developed gradually.
4An SRN’s performance with such recursive structures has also been shown to
ﬁt well to the human data (Christiansen and Chater, 1999).Such networks have also been shown to go beyond the data in interesting
ways. Elman (1998) and Morris et al. (2000) showed that SRNs induce abstract
grammatical categories which allow both distinctions such as subject and object,
and generalizations such that words which have never occurred in one of these
positions are nonetheless predicted to occur, if they share a sufﬁcient number of
abstract properties with a set of words which have occurred there.
Together these results suggest that an SRN might be able to learn the struc-
ture of relative clauses, and generalize that structure to subject position in aux-
questions and thus to learn the aspect of grammar in question despite not hav-
ing access to the sort of evidence that has been assumed necessary. This paper
reports on simulations which show that this is indeed the case. An initial exper-
iment veriﬁes that the two results combine in the required way; then an SRN is
shown to predict (1), but not (2), from training sets based on CHILDES data. This
result clearly runs counter to Chomsky’s argument, and thus indicates that the
amended view of the input necessitates a re-evaluation of all previous poverty of
the stimulus arguments andthat neuralnetworksprovidea meansof doingthis.
2. A Hint of Veriﬁcation
To verify that the sort of generalization suggested is in fact possible, we
trained an SRN on data from an artiﬁcial grammar which generated only a) aux-
questions of the form ‘AUX NP ADJ ?’, and b) sequences of the form ‘Ai NP Bi’,
where Ai and Bi stand for sets of inputs with random content and length. Proper
names, pronouns, and NPs of the form ‘DET ( ADJ ) N ( PP )’ were generated in
both types, and NPs with relative clauses were generated for the ‘Ai NP Bi’ type,
but were restricted from appearing in aux-questions. Some representative exam-
ples are given in Figure 2.
Representing the input in this way ensures that if the network succeeds in
making the correct generalization, then it has succeeded by extracting the struc-
ture of NPs, and of aux-questions, from the statistical regularities in the data, and
generalizing across NPs; any other structure in the data has been abstracted away.
The training regime was similar to that used by Elman (1991,1993). A three-
stage training set was generated from the grammar, with the degree of complex-
ity in NPs increasing at each stage, and the percentage of aux-questions decreas-
ing crudely approximating the structure of child-directed speech. Names and
pronouns constituted 80% of the NPs in the ﬁrst set, and the remaining 20% was
Ai Mummy Bi
Ai she Bi
Ai the dog Bi
Ai the little girl Bi
Ai the cat on the mat Bi
Ai the big dog in the car Bi
Ai the boy who is smiling Bi
is Mummy beautiful?
is she happy?
is the dog hungry?
is the little girl pretty?
is the cat on the mat fat?
is the big dog in the car scary?
* is the boy who is smiling nice?
Figure 2: Examples of various types of utterances generated by the artiﬁcial
grammar. The asterisk indicates the absence of aux-questions with NPs that
contain relative clauses.shared among the other NP forms (such that the more complex the form, the fewer
the instances of it), with relative clauses making up only 1%; there were 40%
aux-questions, and 60% ‘Ai NP Bi’ forms. In the second set, names and pronouns
constituted 70% of the NPs, relative clauses made up 2.5% of the remainder, and
the percentage of aux-questions decreased to 30%. And in the third set, 60% of
the NPs were names or pronouns, relative clauses made up 5% of the remainder,
andthe percentageof aux-questionsdecreasedto 20%. Each trainingset consisted
of 50,000 examples. An SRN was trained on each set successively, for 10 epochs
each, and tested with the structures in (1) and (2) after each epoch.5 The network
received the input one word at a time, and in the same form as used by Elman
(1991, 1993) i.e., a localist representation was used.
Figure 3 shows the network’s predictions for successive words of the ques-
tion “Is the boy who is smoking crazy?” after the third stage of training. The
sequence of predictions is shown from left to right with the target words beneath
the predictions, and the average activation value for each category represented
vertically. The leftmost columns show that the network predicts an AUX as a pos-
sible ﬁrst word, a name, pronoun, or DET as a continuation when presented with
‘is’, and a noun or an adjective as possibilities after ‘is the’. This is not surpris-
ing since these sequences all occur in the training sets. Following presentation
of ‘is the boy’, however, not only is an adjective or a preposition predicted, but
also a relativizer a sequence which never occurs in the training sets. And upon
presentation of ‘who’ the network predicts an AUX, followed by the prediction
of a participle when given ‘is’. The network has thus generalized to predict the
Is the who is smoking crazy ? boy
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Figure 3: The SRN’s categorized predictions for the test sentence “Is the boy
who is smoking crazy?” Target words appear under the network’s predictions;
and the strength of the predictions is represented vertically.
5The networks were simulated with LENS (Rohde, 1999), and trained with
a ﬁxed learning rate of 0.01, using a variation of cross entropy which assigned
smaller errors for predicting incorrectly than for failure to predict. The architec-
ture shown in Figure 1 is used, with 100 input and output units, 50 units in the
reduction layers, and 500 units in both the hidden and context layers.relative clause.6 The network does not make the predictions corresponding to
the ungrammatical form in (2) i.e., the network does not predict a participle
following ‘who’ and should not be expected to, of course, since the training
sets do not contain copula constructions, and so there can be no hypothesis of
a movement derivation. Rather, the network has apparently formed an abstract
representation of NPs which includes NPs with relative clauses. That this is so is
shown by the networks prediction of an adjective when presented with ‘is the boy
who is smoking’; the sequence‘... PARTICIPLE ADJ ...’ neveroccursinthe train-
ing sets, and thus the prediction indicates that the network has formed an abstract
representation of aux-questions, and generalized over the NP forms.
That the data available to children are sufﬁcient to provide for this general-
ization, however, remains to be shown.
3. Child-Directed Speech
There are a number of features of child-directed speech that appear to be
important for language acquisition, and particularly for the issue at hand. Com-
plexity increases overtime which has been shown to be a determinantof learn-
ability (e.g. Elman, 1991, 1993) and there are also arguably meaningful shifts
in the distribution of types, and the limitations on forms.
The increasing complexity of the child’s input is especially relevant to the
problem here, since it is directly linked to the frequency of occurrence of rela-
tive clauses. Complexity in the child’s input is introduced in a way akin to the
staged presentation of data used to train the network in the experiment described
above; Figure 4 charts the occurrences of tagged relative clauses i.e. marked
Figure 4: The percentageof the NPs, in each utterance type, that contain relative
clauses (averaged over all twelve children, and over each third of the period
covered by the corpus).
6The fact that the network predicts ‘who’ given ‘is the boy’ is, on its own,
not enough — early in training, the network will make this prediction, but when
presented with ‘who’ will predict a ‘?’, apparently mistaking the relativizer for
an adjective. That the network is predicting a relative clause is shown by the fact
that it predicts ‘is’ when subsequently given ‘who’, and a participle when then
given ‘is’. Since participles are restricted to only occur in relative clauses, the
latter is decisive.with ‘who’ or ‘that’ found in child-directed speech in the CHILDES’ Manch-
ester corpus (Theakston et al., 2000). Pronominal relatives (e.g., ‘the girl you
like’) show a similar increase, and occur approximately as frequently. And prepo-
sitional phrases increase in frequency slightly more dramatically; they seem to
occur approximately twice as often as relatives.7
The difference between the distribution of types in child-directed speech and
speech between adults is also potentially signiﬁcant. Child-directed speech con-
tains a muchgreater proportionof questions estimated at about one third of the
child’s input (Hart and Risley, 1995; Cameron-Faulkner et al., 2001) and thus
there is more of a balance between types. This may be critical in establishing the
multiplerolesthat,e.g.auxiliaries,cantakeon; andalsoto reserverepresentational
space for the the large variety of question forms. Figure 5 shows the changes in
the percentages of copula constructions, subject-predicate forms (e.g., transitives
and intransitives), and wh-, do-, and aux-questions across the time period covered
by the Manchester corpus.
Figure 5: The percentage occurrence, averaged over all children, of various
forms for each third of the period covered by the corpus.
And, of potentially even greater signiﬁcance for the problem at hand, the
child’s input not only lacks relative clauses in subject position in aux-questions,
but as Figure 6 shows, seldom contains forms in which the subject NP could have
a relative clause. The aux-questions in child-directed speech overwhelminglyuse
proper names, pronouns, deictics, and other such forms which do not provide the
correct context for a relative clause. This is an aspect of child-directedspeech that
may both give rise to the absence of relative clauses in aux-questions given the
low frequency of relative clauses in general and also be necessary for the cor-
rect generalization to be formed. If this were not the case, and questions like ‘Is
the boy crazy?’ were common, then the generalization would be threatened: each
7A precise count of the prepositional phrases has not been made — in part
because of the lesser signiﬁcance to the current research issue, and in part because
it is considerably more problematic to determine whether or not a prepositional
phrase is within a noun phrase. But, (Cameron-Faulkner et al., 2001) analyzed a
sample from this same corpus, and they report that prepositional phrases make up
about 10% of all fragments, which may be indicative of their general frequency.such occurrence would produce a false prediction, and so provide negative evi-
dence against the wanted generalization.
Figure 6: The composition of the subject NPs in aux-questions,i.e., the percent-
age, averaged over all twelve children, of subject NPs that are of each type.
4. Motherese and the Generalization
To determine if an SRN would generalize to predict (1), but not (2), from
input of the sort provided to children, the above analysis was used as the ba-
sis of a new set of training data, and the simulations repeated. As before, the
training sets contained aux-questions of the form ‘AUX NP ADJ?’; but here the
‘Ai NP Bi’ forms were eliminated, and copula constructions, subject-predicate
forms, and wh- and do-questions were added. The prohibition on NPs with rel-
ative clauses in aux-questions extended also to wh- and do-questions i.e. NPs
with relative clauses could occur in object position in these forms, but not in sub-
ject position. Thus these training sets also contained no evidence of the sort as-
sumed to distinguish the structure-dependent hypothesis. Some examples from
these training sets are given in Figure 7. The proportions of these general types,
and the frequency of relative clauses and prepositional phrases, were manipulated
in each portionof the trainingset to match with successive portionsof the Manch-
Mummy is beautiful.
the little boy bites.
the cat on the couch scratches.
the boy who is smiling smokes.
...
does Mary smoke?
does the dog bite?
does the cat on the mat scratch?
does he like the girl who is dancing?
...
where did the man go?
why did the little girl go home?
what about the piece with the dot?
who is the boy who is smoking?
is Mummy beautiful?
is the little boy nice?
is the cat on the couch mangy?
* is the boy who is smiling mean?
...
is Mary pretty?
is the dog mangy?
is the cat on the mat fat?
* is the girl who is dancing clumsy?
...
is the man scary?
is the little girl happy?
is the piece with the dot broken?
* is the boy who is smoking silly?
Figure 7: Utterances generated by the artiﬁcial grammar.ester data e.g., the type distributions can be read directlyfrom ﬁgure5. And, as
pertheobservationoftheprevioussection, nounphrasesin aux-questionswerere-
stricted to be, almost exclusively,pronouns,deitics, and names. The three training
sets again consisted of 50,000 examples each; and again the network was trained
for 10 epochs on each set, and was tested with the structures in (1) and (2) after
each epoch.
Figures 8 and 9 chart the sum-squarederror for (1) and (2) after each stage of
training. As the ﬁgures show, the network succeeds in generalizing to predict (1),
Figure 8: The sum-squarederror after each word of the test sentence “Is the boy
who is smoking crazy?” at the end of each stage of training.
Figure 9: The sum-squarederror after each word of the test sentence “Is the boy
who smoking is crazy?” at the end of each stage of training.and generates signiﬁcant error and progressively larger error at several
points, when presented with (2).8 The reasonably small error generated by the
network when presented with ‘who’ in the context of ‘is the boy ’ shows that the
relativizer is predicted. And the contrast in the errors generated by the subsequent
presentation of either ‘is’ or ‘smoking’ shows clearly that the network has learned
to predict an AUX after a relativizer, rather than entertaining the possibility of it’s
extraction, as in (2). Note, as well, that this contrast is monotonically increas-
ing at no point in training does the network predict a participle to follow the
relativizer. And, for (1), the network’s error is quite low for each successive word,
including the presentation of the adjective after the participle, despite that ‘...
PARTICIPLE ADJ ...’ never occurs in the training sets. In contrast, for (2), as well
as the error producedby the presentationof ‘smoking’, the network also generates
a substantial error upon the subsequent presentation of ‘is’; And though when
presented with ‘is the boy who smoking is ’ the network successfully predicts
an adjective, the success is illusory: when subsequently presented with ‘crazy’
the network’s predictions are somewhat random, but a period is predicted more
strongly than a question mark.
The network does, however, have some difﬁculties with this input. Although
the grammar restricts relative clauses to the form ‘REL AUX VERBing’, the net-
work persists in predicting noun phrases and adjectives after the auxiliary pre-
sumably because the ‘is’ that occurs in initial position in aux-questions, followed
by a noun phrase, and the ‘is’ in declaratives, followed by an adjective, are rela-
tively more frequent in the data than the ‘is’ in relative clauses. These erroneous
predictions, however, gradually erode. And it is worth noting that they would be
correct for a more realistic grammar.
The error associated with the adjective following the participle most likely
has a similar source. Relative clauses occur only in either sentence ﬁnal position,
or preceding an auxiliary or a verb; thus the network initially expects participles
to be followed by either a verb, a period, a question mark, or most prominently,
an auxiliary. Again the problem is somewhat persistent, but is gradually resolved;
by the end of the third stage such predictions, though remaining, are substan-
tially weaker than the correct predictions thus, arguably, not truly problem-
atic. And it is plausible that such errors would not arise were the grammar to
be made yet more realistic. The grammar used here contained little variation in
terms of either NP types, syntactic structures, or lexical items, and thus gener-
alizations were based on a quite limited set of distributional cues. Lifting the
artiﬁcial limitations on the grammar might also help to eliminate such errors:
questions like ‘what’s the lady who was at the house called?’ in Manchester’s
ruth28a.cha are not only evidence of the sort assumed not to be available, but
also data which discourage these sorts of false predictions.
But, such errors are also potentially meaningful. The most prominent and
persistent of the errors is the prediction of an auxiliary following the participle,
i.e., ‘is the boywhois smokingis ...’; in fact anauxiliaryis predictedas a possible
8The SRN responsible for these results incorporates a variant of the develop-
mental mechanism from (Elman, 1993). That version reset the context layer at
increasing intervals; the version used here is similar, but does not reset the context
units unless the network’s prediction error is greater than a set threshold value.continuation after any NP, e.g.,‘is the boy is ...’. And this is an error that children
make as well (Crain and Thornton, 1998).
5. Discussion
Assumptions as to the nature of the input, and the ability of the learner to uti-
lize the informationtherein, clearly play a critical role in determiningwhich prop-
erties of language to attribute to UG. These assumptions must be accurate if UG is
to be attributed with all and only those properties of language “that can reason-
ably be supposed not to have been learned” (Chomsky, 1975). An overestimate of
either the learner or the input will attribute too little to UG; an underestimate will
attribute properties to UG which are, in fact, learned.
The objective here was to demonstrate the necessity of taking into ac-
count amidst a growing body of evidence that children use it the stochastic
information in child-directed speech. To be convincing we have taken on Chom-
sky’s celebrated argument that structure-dependence must be a principle of UG;
have been careful to avoid providing the network with input that could be con-
troversial with respect to its availability; and have represented the input in a way
that encodes no grammatical information beyond what can be determined from
its statistical regularities. This thus substantially under-represents the information
actually available to children (since contextual cues, phonological similarity, and
other sources of information are abstracted away), and so the fact that a neural
network generalizes to make the correct predictions, from data modeled in this
way, shows that learnability claims based on a non-stochastic model of the input
must be reassessed.
The statistical structure of languageprovides for far more sophisticated infer-
ences than those which can be made within a theory that considers only whether
or not a particular form appears in the input. But determining the potential worth
of the stochastic information is difﬁcult. This work shows that neural networks
provide a means of dealing with this problem. As demonstrated here, neural net-
works can be used to assess just how impoverished the stimulus really is, and so
can be invaluableto linguists in establishing whetherornot a propertyoflanguage
can reasonably be assumed not to have been learned.
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